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The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments is a comprehensive and 
unprecedented collection of works meticulously compiled by Stuart, Fehige 
and Brown, the pioneers on the topic of thought experiments. The mag-
nitude of the volume is nothing short of impressive as it draws together 
contributors dispersed across numerous spheres of philosophical inquiry. 
It is divided into four major parts, taking four different perspectives in ap-
proaching the discussion.
The fi rst part is a selection of papers covering the topic of thought ex-
periments from a historical perspective. It opens with a piece entitled “The 
triple life of thought experiments” by Katarina Ierodiakonou. In the be-
ginning, she presents a couple of thought experiments from the antiquity 
including the one found in Aristotle’s Physics of a man standing on the edge 
of the universe trying to extend his hand, the famous Ring of Gyges from 
Plato’s Republic and the Sextus Empiricus’ in Against the Physicists deal-
ing with the possibility of motion with regards to the existence of atoms, all 
of them serving the function of either confi rming or refuting a particular 
theory. The purpose of her article is twofold; she explores the notion of 
thought experiments in ancient philosophy as a concept compared to its 
use in contemporary philosophy while also introducing a novel, somewhat 
uncommon role of thought experiments which was characteristic of the 
ancient Sceptics. In discussing the former she emphasizes that the term 
itself is a novel concoction and as such it has not been used by the an-
cient Greeks. Furthermore, she argues that they did not think of thought 
experiments as a special category of philosophical endeavor as they are 
thought of in contemporary philosophy but rather they were considered to 
be examples, corresponding to the Greek word paradeigmata. Nonetheless, 
she does not consider that to be an obstacle in applying the term thought 
experiments to their ‘examples’ as they share some of the core properties 
with what we call thought experiments.
After she has laid the ground for discussing the ancient ‘examples’ as 
thought experiments she delves into the function and usage of TE’s by the 
ancients offering an additional role to the confi rmation or refutation of a 
theory, namely the suspension of belief, which can be found in the works of 
ancient Sceptics. Looking past refutation and confi rmation as their func-
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tion in discussions, she takes a step back specifying a general characteris-
tic of ancient thought experiments: “the imaginary assumption initiates a 
process of thinking without a previously settled or determined conclusion, 
namely a series of arguments that should be clearly spelt out, compelling us 
to make up our mind on a particular subject” (35) which she considers to be 
the controversial nature of thought experiments. In support of that claim, 
she outlines the discussion between the Stoics and the Sceptics on several 
thought experiments, two of which are Plutarch’s The Ship of Theseus and 
Chrysippus’s Dion and Theon. Both the Stoics and the Sceptics agreed on 
the aforementioned controversial nature of thought experiments although 
they reached opposing conclusions; the Stoics used them to confi rm or refute 
a thesis while Sceptics aimed at inducing a suspension of belief by allowing 
the possibility of reaching different conclusions.
Thus, what we can take home from her article is not just a piece of the 
historical puzzle of the ancient thought experiments but a lesson from the 
Sceptics as to the suspension of judgment which, in the contemporary set-
ting is not advisable to be used with relentlessness and vigor of the Scep-
tics, but could at least make us more wary and less eager to settle for a 
conclusion which is controversial and ambiguous. Our skepticism should be 
rationed in healthy doses but employed nonetheless for it keeps us on our 
philosophical toes.
The second part of the collection is dedicated to the thought experiments 
with regards to specifi c branches of philosophy. Georg Brun’s “Thought ex-
periments in ethics” is a compact and systematic analysis of thought ex-
periments in the domain of ethics. After briefl y outlining several thought 
experiments of the contemporary discussion including the ‘Trolley’, ‘Pond’, 
‘Violinist’, ‘Ticking Bomb’, and the ‘Original Position’ he engages in a re-
construction of the thought experiments by explicating three key elements: 
“(1) A scenario and a question are introduced. (2) The experimenter goes 
through (imagines, thinks about, etc.) the scenario and arrives at some re-
sult. (3) A conclusion is drawn with respect to some target (e.g., an ethically 
relevant claim or distinction)” (196). Consequently, he makes a distinction 
between ‘core’ thought experiments which rely on the fi rst two conditions 
and the extended ones which involve all of the three aforementioned prop-
erties thereupon dedicating the rest of the article to the analysis of the ex-
tended thought experiments. Firstly, his efforts are directed towards ‘epis-
temic’ thought experiments where he differentiates between constructive 
and destructive ones which are certainly the most prevalent functions of 
thought experiments together with it being one of the more commonplace 
classifi cations, inspired by James R. Brown. Constructive ones can either 
argue for the possibility of certain scenarios or provide support for a par-
ticular claim or a theory, while destructive are used as counterexamples to 
some claims emphasizing the problems with certain ideas. Subsequently, he 
turns to illustrative and rhetorical thought experiments. Illustrative, as the 
name says, are intended to illustrate or make the problem more vivid and 
relatable thus increasing the understanding of the experimenter. Rhetori-
cal ones are similar to illustrative, however, they are employed when prov-
ing a particular point or arguing for a certain position. Pond experiment can 
be used as both of those. Another type are heuristic thought experiments 
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whose function resembles an ‘exploratory mission’ where the core experi-
ment is run in experimenter’s mind in order to analyze the consequences 
and where it takes the experimenter. Sometimes they are used in determin-
ing which factors are relevant for evoking certain intuitions. As an example, 
Foot’s Trolley case has several variations which entice different intuitions 
about the problem. Their function is to extract the information relevant for 
making moral judgments.
He emphasizes that although epistemic thought experiments are the 
locus of the discussion on thought experiments, according to some accounts 
illustrative and heuristic ones do not fall behind in relevance. Specifi cally, 
it has been argued that understanding could be an important epistemic goal 
of thought experiments, no less potent than generating novel knowledge, 
to which illustrative and heuristic experiments majorly contribute. In dis-
cussing the functions of thought experiments, he narrows the scope to the 
ones grounded on refl ective equilibrium since the functions vary with re-
spect to meta-ethical theoretical framework. He discusses ‘wide’ refl ective 
equilibrium which contains two components; one being that “judgments and 
principles are justifi ed if judgments, principles and background theories 
are in equilibrium” (202) and the other that “this state is reached through 
a process that starts from judgments and background theories, proposes 
systematic principles and then mutually adjusts judgments and principles” 
(202). Under the assumption of cognitive equilibrium, thought experiments 
can be constructive in which an experimenter can produce a commitment to 
an option at any stage in the process, either in core experiments or in the 
extended ones, while deconstructive thought experiments use as a premise 
the result of a core experiment to point out the fl aws in a theory or in the 
background assumptions which are challenged in the extended version.
There are several issues with the thought experiments in ethics, which 
are outlined in this paper. On the one hand, concerning those aiming at the 
result of core thought experiments, it has been argued that they reveal ex-
plicit commitments which appear in experimenter’s mind which is not nec-
essarily how they would act were they faced in real situations. Furthermore, 
there is an issue with regards to intuitions since core thought experiments 
elicit ‘raw’ intuitions which can be revised in the extended ones during the 
process of cognitive equilibrium. The person could conclude the opposite of 
the content of his intuition in cognitive equilibrium, and some would argue 
that defeats the purpose of fi nding out what really is morally relevant. On 
the other hand, concerning the problems of extended thought experiments, 
destructive thought experiments do not always succeed in refuting the the-
ory and it can point to the need for rethinking some assumptions, however, 
it does not pinpoint which information, in particularly, has to be revised. 
Moreover, some thought experiments are analogies constructed based on a 
theory in support of it which is problematic since in order for transferring 
assumptions they need to be explicated.
Challenges to thought experiments are numerous and are directed ei-
ther to a certain function of thought experiment or to a specifi c thought 
experiment. The author briefl y outlines various ways in which thought ex-
periments are put on spot, for example, the issue of intuitions generated 
by them, the possibility or lack thereof to be carried out in the real world, 
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deriving to conclusions etc.  Naturally, Brun pays more attention to some 
well-known objections directed to ethical thought experiments, namely the 
ones questioning how realistic should thought experiments be and the oth-
ers that argue for them being misleading or generating faulty results.
Turning to challenges which address the problem of thought experi-
ments being unrealistic, it is argued that they do not justify moral prin-
ciples which are developed to govern our actions in real life situations to 
which the author replies that some thought experiments deal with more 
fundamental principles that lead moral judgments to which thought experi-
ments still hold relevance. Another challenge argues for the unreliability 
of core experiments of unrealistic scenarios by either questioning the reli-
ability of intuitions or inability to discern what is morally relevant because 
of our own beliefs.
A distinct set of challenges assert that thought experiments are mis-
leading on several accounts; one being that they pose dubious questions not 
encountered in our day-to-day lives or questions which limit the scope of an-
swer. As an example he uses the “Should you pull the lever?”, one which is 
not a plausible real life situation and which can only be answered with ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ thus ‘leading the witness’, so to speak. Additionally, it is argued that 
they implicitly contain problematic assumptions while side tracking the 
additional information which might prove to be essential. Lastly, there is 
one more challenge to thought experiments, addressing the fact that some 
thought experiments are constructed in the form of analogies so that they 
lead the experimenter to draw conclusions about a situation different than 
what has been depicted in the experiment, examples of which are Pond and 
Ticking Time-bomb thought experiments. The author replies to two such 
objections to using analogies.
The author concludes with the warning that the discussion on thought 
experiments in ethics should not be taken lightly as inadequately construct-
ed thought experiments may be used in public discourse for promoting im-
moral and problematic agendas. This paper is instructional both for novices 
in the exploration of ethics as a branch of philosophy as well as for the 
students tinkering with the subject of thought experimentation. It would 
prove to be no less useful for the experts of both fi elds as it compresses a 
masterfully elegant compendium of ethical intricacies which could prove to 
be a valuable reference text.
Nancy Nersessian’s article “Cognitive science, mental modelling, and 
thought” experiments explores the underlying cognitive mechanisms which 
are employed in the process of thought experimenting.  Her efforts are di-
rected to accounting for the psychological frameworks which make such in-
quiries possible and which ultimately generate the knowledge that is novel 
in our everyday lives as well as in the work of science. Her hypotheses are 
supplemented by an overview of the body of work she offers from the fi elds 
of psychology, cognitive and neurosciences, and philosophy. After briefl y in-
troducing some basic notions and problems of thought experimentation, she 
outlines the ‘story so far’ concerning the mental model framework of which 
she has been the architect alongside Nenad Miščević in this vast edifi ce 
that is the discussion on thought experiments. From the introduction of the 
term ‘mental model’ by Kenneth Craik in 1943 who hypothesized them as a 
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modus operandi of people’s reasoning about physical situations by means of 
employing internal models in exploring them, to the no less infl uential work 
of Johnson-Laird whose Mental Models (1983) exploring the notion of logi-
cal reasoning, working memory and mental models. Although their views of 
mental models differ in some respects it undoubtedly casts a shadow over 
the investigation and discussions of them in years to come which is enor-
mous and beyond the scope of Nersessian’s paper.
Consequently, her attention is directed to interpreting literature on 
discourse and situational models in dealing with the issue of how mental 
models are constructed, the prevalent view being that thought experiments 
are revealed through narrative. However, the importance of narrative does 
not lie in the “system of propositions representing the content of the text” 
(313) to which we apply rules of inferences but rather that the model being 
manipulated is that of the situation represented by narratives as “discourse 
models make explicit the structure not of sentences but of situations as we 
perceive or imagine them (Johnson-Laird 1989: 471)” (313) In support of 
that claim, she mentions several experiments all pointing to the aforemen-
tioned hypothesis.
According to Nersessian, another key cognitive faculty which partakes 
in thought experimenting is mental spatial simulation which means that 
humans have the ability to mentally transform and manipulate objects in 
space that is akin to the physical transformation. After giving a couple of 
examples in overviewing the literature exploring such capacities she con-
cludes with the words of Kosslyn that: “psychological research provides 
evidence of rotating, translating, bending, scaling folding, zooming, and 
fl ipping of images” (314). It is hypothesized that such abilities are due to 
‘internalized constraints assimilated during perception’. Additionally, she 
cites the research which points to physical knowledge taking part in imagi-
nary transformation noticing the subtle connection of imagination, percep-
tion and action emphasis that mental spatial simulation can be employed 
in manipulating both representational and non-representation content. 
Supplementing that notion with the literature on mental imagery and spa-
tial simulation she concludes that perceptual and motor mechanisms do in 
fact largely contribute to construction and manipulation of mental images.
Together with mental simulation she explores the subject of mental 
animation. Even though they are closely related, mental simulation deals 
with spatial and temporal transformation, while mental animation includes 
causal and behavioral knowledge. In other words, mental animation is about 
mentally bringing static representation to life by inferring motion. To illus-
trate this, she uses prominent research done by Mary Hegarty’s Pulley sys-
tems and Daniel Swartz’s gear rotation studies which supply evidence for 
the human ability to perform “simulative causal transformations of static 
fi gures” (316). She highlights several fi ndings, some of which are that par-
ticipants animate the objects in a sequence which is dissimilar to how they 
would be manipulated in the physical world, they often use gestures while 
performing such mental actions, etc. together with the fi ndings from the in-
terference paradigm which imply that performing physically incongruent 
action to the mental animation prolongs the participant’s response time. Ad-
ditionally, she provides insight into neuroimaging studies which show that 
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the same brain areas involved in carrying out motor actions are employed in 
mental simulation, not to mention the fact that observing an action engages 
the brain in a similar fashion to actually performing the action.
In efforts to ground her theory in the long-term memory representation 
as the paper so far outlines compelling evidence just in the domain of work-
ing memory she includes the research done on embodied mental represen-
tation. The research on embodied mental representation aims to show that 
perception and action are integral to numerous cognitive processes such as 
“memory, conceptual processing, and lan guage comprehension” (317). She 
outlines two strands of research in the domain of embodied mental simula-
tion. One deals with the representation of spatial information in mental 
models the results of which indicate that spatial representation is not ‘3D 
Euclidian’ in relation to one’s body and gravity. In other words, representa-
tion of spatial information is ‘egotistical’ linked to the person’s body as a 
frame of reference.
Another line of research she lays out tackles the representation of con-
cepts. In support of Barsalou’s view that mental representations maintain 
perceptual features which are reenacted during cognitive processes, which 
is his interpretation of current research in cognitive and neurosciences, she 
also outlines his distinction between modal and amodal features of concepts, 
introducing the idea of perceptual symbols as fundamental representations 
of both conceptual and sensimotor processing.
The aim of the research disclosed to this point aimed at setting the stage 
and being constituent of thought experiments as simulative model based 
reasoning. The cornerstone of such view is that people in their reasoning 
take advantage of mental models which they manipulate through simula-
tion. Thus, mental models can be described as organized representations 
which are determined by the constraints of experience and current under-
standing like the knowledge of spatio-temporal relations and properties of 
entities, processes etc. The aforementioned constraints are as Nersessian 
enumerates them: “tacit and explicit knowledge of spatio-temporal rela-
tions, the represented situations, entities, processes, and other perti nent 
information such as causal structure” (319). In manipulating mental mod-
els we draw from linguistic, auditory, visual, kinesthetic and many other 
cognitive faculties.  She sees thought experiments as fundamental to hu-
man reasoning and as such its application to scientifi c reasoning is all the 
more reasonable. Even though certainly more complex in nature, they are 
also accessed through narratives, which, as we have already seen, entice 
the experimenter to manipulate the mental model of the situation depicted, 
rather than draw inferences from proposition-like statements. Further, she 
distinguishes between fi ctitious imaginings and thought experiments with 
real life consequences in human day-to-day reasoning deeming the latter as 
far more signifi cant. On that account, she argues that thought experiments 
in science exploit the same capacities she outlined so far in the paper. Her 
hypothesis being:
that the carefully crafted thought-experimental narra tive leads to the construc-
tion of a mental model of a kind of situation and that simulating the consequenc-
es of the situation as it unfolds in time affords epistemic access to specifi c aspects 
of a way of representing the world. (320)
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Lastly, she tackles Norton’s view of thought experiments as arguments 
which enforces the notion that thought experiments produce truths about 
the nature. Nersessian, seeing such a view as too “epistemically potent” 
(320), offers two arguments to oppose it. The fi rst being that thought experi-
ments refer to the kind of phenomena being explored, not to the particular 
situation, thus making them generic. Second, she argues that science uses 
many devices and practices which do not always generate truths about the 
phenomena but, nonetheless, tell us something about the nature of things.
In the introduction of their paper “Intuition and its critics”, Steven Stich 
and Kevin Tobia draw a parallel between linguistics and philosophy with re-
gards to intuition. In Chomskian terms, intuition drives the spontaneous ap-
plication of grammatical properties and rules to novel sentences. The speaker 
does not have to be consciously aware of the rules when they make grammati-
cality judgments and sometimes it is possible to make errors in judgments 
because of various factors that might impede on speaker’s attention, memory 
etc. Similarly, philosophers have posed questions about the world and its 
characteristics in the form of hypothetical situations, evoking the intuitions 
which present themselves instantly in minds of participants of such discus-
sions without explicit appeal to the rules of reasoning. On that note, their 
paper is based on the use of term intuition “for the spontaneous judgments 
that people make about philosophical thought experiments” (370).
After defi ning their use of the term “intuition”, they set out to explore 
the usage of intuition as evidence in philosophy which brings them to the 
pre-Chomskian years of logical positivists whose view on the purpose of phi-
losophy was conceptual analysis. Alongside this view, one of the methods 
of conceptual analysis were thought experiments and compiling intuitions 
evoked by them was the means of acquiring evidential signifi cance. Justifi -
cation for their use is similar to the aforementioned Chomskian take on in-
tuitions about grammar shared by philosophers such as Alvin Goldman who 
maintains that intuitions can bear relevance in exploration of the content or 
extension of the concept. Another view makes use of intuitions as evidence 
for or against theories about phenomena in philosophical discussions for 
example truth, justice, good etc. different from conceptual analysis in that 
they do not seek to pinpoint the people’s concept of these things. Conjoint-
ly, these two stances correspond to two ways of dealing with philosophical 
problems depending on their goal as outlined by Goldman and Pust:
Broadly speaking, views about philosophical analysis may be divided into those 
that take the targets of such analysis to be in-the-head psychological entities 
versus outside-the-head non-psychological entities. We shall call the fi rst type of 
position mentalism and the second extra-mentalism (1998, 183). (370)
Accordingly, mentalist analysis deals with investigation of concepts or in-
the-head psychological entities sometimes aided by implicit or tacit theories 
in their explanation of intuition generation. Conversely, extra-mentalism’s 
analytic aim is harder to discern thus Goldman and Pust in efforts of nar-
rowing down the scope of its inquiry emphasize three domains of their ex-
ploration: universals or Platonic forms, modal truths and natural kinds, 
taxonomy to which Stich adds moral facts. Their common denominator is 
that: “the correctness or incorrectness of an extra-mentalist theory does 
not depend on what is in the head of a person whose intuitions are used 
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as evidence” (371). They consider people’s intuitions to be the truth about 
the extra-mental entities they explore. The problem with such account is 
the ambiguity and inexplicability of the connections between intuitions and 
aforementioned domains since it is not clear how we intuitively access for 
example Platonic forms. However, more problematic claim of extra mental-
ism is the previously mentioned stance that intuitions derived from thought 
experiments indiscriminately illicit the truth about these extra mental enti-
ties. Further, intuitions are challenged by another strong and budding philo-
sophical branch: the experimental philosophy. Contrary to extra-mentalist 
position, evidence from experimental philosophy indicate that intuitions 
vary among people depending on a number of factors which they briefl y out-
line in the followings sections  including the variation of intuition with re-
gards to demographic groups, language and order in which the experiments 
are presented. Furthermore, fi ndings from experimental philosophy also in-
dicate that intuitions are not immune to framing effects and that they are 
affected by the physical and social environment in which they are evoked. 
(Thus, intuition one person has in the Trolley case of pulling the lever does 
not mean that pulling the lever is morally permissible since another person 
has the intuition of not pulling the lever) Besides the fact that studies show 
that intuitions vary across groups and conditions in which they are elicited, 
an additional problem is that people of the same groups and under the same 
conditions still seem to report having differing intuitions.
As a side note, most of these studies also endanger the mentalist stance on 
concepts with the exception of evidence that suggests that people of different 
demographic groups have in fact distinct concepts. As an example, people’s 
concepts vary with respect to the academic fi eld of their interest. Though such 
evidence do not pose problems for mentalist position on concepts per se, it 
should be specifi ed beforehand whose concepts and why they are investigat-
ing. The fi ndings brought forth by experimental philosophy undoubtedly pose 
problems for mentalist and extra-mentalist analyses. In rising to their chal-
lenge, Stich and Tobia propose two ways of overcoming them.
The fi rst appeals to professional ineptitude of the participants in the 
studies, also known as the expertise defense, which argues that the studies 
do not offer valuable insight for philosophy since the participants them-
selves are not professional philosophers. Analogous to other professions, we 
seem to deem the intuitions of doctors or chess players of more relevance 
than those of amateurs in those fi elds. There are several positions one can 
assume in taking the expertise defense; one asserts that philosophers are 
less likely to be seduced by the aforesaid factors which interfere with gen-
erating intuitions such as the order of presentation, framing or “ambient 
odors” while the other relies on the notion that intuitions of philosophers 
are more accurate than those of non-philosophers.
Stich does not hold the former approach in high-esteem as evidence, 
although scarce, does not seem to point to philosophers’ immunity to such 
hindrances. The latter approach, enforced by Daniel Devitt in the domain 
of philosophy of language leave much to be desired. He engaged in an ex-
tensive theoretical exploration of the subject which regrettably has not bar-
ren fruit in the empirical, experimental examination so far. Granted, it is 
extremely diffi cult to empirically test whether philosopher’s intuitions are 
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in fact more accurate than regular folk’s intuitions so Devitt’s efforts are 
nothing if not commendable. Still, one can take an alternative approach to 
what has been outlined so far, known as the restrictive accounts of philo-
sophical intuitions. By defi ning intuitions more narrowly, their incentives 
are to explain why intuitions might be reliable enough to count as evidence 
and to fend of the attacks of experimental philosophy. One of the authors 
who endorse the restrictive position with respect to intuitions is Ludwig 
who proposed that only the intuitions derived from conceptual competence 
are the ones which are valid. Conversely, those infl uenced by factors men-
tioned earlier like framing or order of presentation which do not fall under 
the conceptual competence should not be regarded as intuitions. Such view, 
however, is not without its problems since it is almost impossible to tease 
apart conceptual competence from those interfering factors since the ex-
perimenter herself is not consciously aware of them. Authors like Cappelen 
even go a step further in their restriction of what intuitions entail narrow-
ing their scope so profusely that even philosophical discussions do not seem 
to include them. In that sense, experimental philosophy does not endanger 
the philosophical practice but consequently, his proposal has not gained 
much momentum among philosophers. The paper ends on an optimistic 
note that even though intuitions are highly problematic they should not be 
discarded but rather they should be thoroughly explored further in which 
experimental philosophy should play a key role.
Let me pass on to Michael Stuart’s “How thought experiments increase 
understanding”. As the title indicates, this paper belongs to the domain 
of epistemology, its aim being the capability of thought experiments to in-
crease understanding. The answers to why that function of thought experi-
ments should be analyzed, are brought forth in the very beginning of the 
paper. Upon noticing that a great deal of discussion on thought experiments 
from the epistemological perspective is concerned with the question of how 
thought experiments generate new knowledge without experience, the au-
thor has directed his efforts to an important epistemological aspect which 
does not receive as much attention as it should, namely the contribution of 
thought experiments to understanding. As he points out, there are numer-
ous roles thought experiments can assume to contribute to understanding 
the world among which are illustration of a theory, exemplifi cation of prop-
erties and relations, provision of hypotheses and many others. Their sole 
function need not be increasing the experimenter’s knowledge to be episte-
mologically signifi cant. In order to see how thought experiments increase 
understanding, the author fi rst tackles what understanding is and what 
it entails. He highlights Catherine Elgin’s view on the subject which does 
not limit understanding to propositional knowledge but widens the scope to 
include work, actions, passions, situations etc.
Along the lines of her claim, there have been many classifi cations and 
subtypes of understanding; transitive and intransitive, propositional and 
non-propositional, interrogative and noninterrogative, to name a few. How-
ever, the focus of this paper is on three types of understanding: explanatory 
understanding (EU), objectual understanding (OU) and practical under-
standing (PU). Explanatory understanding is based on explaining, as the 
name says, of why some state of the matter is the way it is and it often but 
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not always, takes the form of propositions.  Objectual understanding is the 
understanding of a thing, or an object itself and in relation to the context 
and subject matter it is immersed in. Finally, practical understanding is 
akin to tacit or implicit knowledge, basically knowledge “how” for example 
“Jimi understands how to play the guitar” (529) and it is contrasted with 
explanatory as it is not run-of-the-mill propositional knowledge.
It is mentioned that there is a debate about whether some kinds of un-
derstanding previously outlined can be reduced to just two or even one sub-
type of understanding. Stuart insists on their separation arguing that each 
type is obtained differently and we have distinct ways of pinning down their 
realization. Naturally, while explanatory understanding should strive for 
providing a better explanation of a phenomena and practical understanding 
should foster some abilities, objectual understanding is not as easy to pin 
down as its purpose is the understanding of the relations between things 
such as entities, events or experiences, objects and background knowledge. 
The authors opts for understanding the semantic content.
In subsequent sections the possibility of each of these types of under-
standing as a result of thought experimentation are given a closer look. In 
support of the hypothesis that thought experiments contribute to explana-
tion, several arguments and studies are offered; one being an online sur-
vey which showed that people (some of which professional philosophers) 
strongly favor thought experiments as a method of explanation, another 
was a study on thought experiments in textbooks which reported that many 
thought experiments are employed because of their explanatory power even 
though they may be outdated. Further, they are prevalent in literature for 
explaining a variety of phenomena, for example, Darwin’s vertebrate eye, 
Newton’s cannonball etc. Explanation can also be viewed as consolidat-
ing phenomena that are in opposition to each other “why does x happen 
as opposed to y?” (531). In such case thought experiments also do not fall 
short. It is also stated that they provide explanation in situations where 
causal relation is sought, for example, in counterfactuals, causal chains etc. 
What these examples tell us is that thought experiments do increase un-
derstanding since explanation and understanding seem to be inextricably 
linked. Furthermore, thought experiments, as it is argued, seem to increase 
meaningfulness by enhancing the semantic connections between objects, 
entities, experiences and so on in contribution to objectual understanding 
(OU). The scientifi c thought experiments often assume such roles as they 
make the problematic and sometimes unfathomable concepts or theories 
more accessible to the laymen as well as to the students on their way to be-
coming experts. The history of science is abundant with such examples and 
two of them are briefl y outlined in this paper, namely Darwin’s vertebrate 
eye and Maxwell’s demon.
Thus, the author asserts that thought experiments help us make seman-
tic connections between concepts, theories, entities and between our past 
and present experiences, abilities etc.
Consequently, several remarks are disclosed in arguing for their fruit-
fulness. What is meant by that is the property of some thought experiments 
which makes us able to do something we had not been able to do before 
engaging in thought experiment for example “manipulate a model, make 
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a successful prediction, produce a good explanation for a phenomena, de-
rive to a particular conclusion” (533). To support his claim, he mentions a 
couple of examples such as using thought experiments in therapy in order 
for clients to confront their fears, in education for incapacitating students 
to make further predictions and inferences about phenomena but also in 
the history of science as Darwin’s vertebrate eye nudged the scientists in 
the following years to acquire the mechanisms by which evolution functions 
thus generating new hypotheses. As to how thought experiments increase 
understanding, the author focuses on objectual and practical understanding 
since explanatory is beyond the scope of this paper.
In explaining objectual understanding he references the work of Eliza-
beth Camp and her notions of perspective, characterization and frames. Per-
spective is the position we assume with respect to the world described in 
the narrative “as if it were the way the narrative presents it” (534). The 
application of perspective to a particular instance or a situation is labeled 
characterization (534). Framed is described as: “a representa tional vehicle 
that crystalizes a perspective by suggesting a characterization” (534). With 
the aid of these terms, the author further explicates how they contribute 
to understanding. Thought experiments provide frames with which we tap 
into characterizations. Although they are non-propositional they can be 
transcribed in forms of propositions but that is not where their potency 
lies. As Stuart asserts, they are “tools for thinking” (535) and good thought 
experiments are those which provide good frames by which we can assume 
a certain perspective which will be of epistemological signifi cance.
In dealing with practical understanding, he highlights Alison Hill’s 
explanation in terms of ‘grasping’ and ‘cognitive control’. Having cogni-
tive control means having the ability to manipulate propositions, i.e. to ex-
plain propositions and what can be deduced from them, to form analogies 
of propositions etc. Even though her account focuses primarily on propo-
sitions, Stuart argues that it can be applied in cases of gaining practical 
understanding by thought experimenting. That can be achieved by expo-
sure to questions and analogies which have to be worked through to get a 
certain result. In that sense, they thought experiments should be formed 
in a way that they provide the necessary information and some guidelines 
to point the experimenter in the right direction, however, the result should 
be gained independently by working out a certain conundrum thus gaining 
‘cognitive control’. Gaining practical understanding can also be achieved 
through various tasks and puzzles, the important element being, as he as-
serts, the open-endedness of a particular problem without giving away pos-
sible solutions before going through an experiment in one’s mind. Finally, 
he proposes some ways of exploring whether thought experiments increase 
understanding by introducing and testing them in educational academic 
settings.
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